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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, political philosophers have been expressing increasing 
dissatisfaction with the dominant, Rawls-inspired, methodological paradigm in 
theorizing about justice. Much of their frustration with this paradigm stems from its 
perceived inability to deliver principles capable of guiding action in real-world 
circumstances. Rawls’s focus on the ideally just society, so the critics argue, is 
practically idle and potentially counter-productive. If political philosophy is meant to 
help us orient our actions in the real world, Rawlsian ‘ideal theorizing’ is just the 
wrong way to think about the subject (see, e.g., Baier 1985, McCarthy 2004, Mills 
2005).1  
 Amartya Sen’s most recent work, culminating in the monograph The Idea of 
Justice, offers one of the most forceful and authoritative articulations of this general 
dissatisfaction with Rawls-inspired political philosophy (Sen 2006 and 2009). Despite 
his admiration for Rawls’s work,2 Sen argues that political philosophy should move 
beyond the Rawlsian methodological outlook – which Sen calls ‘transcendental 
institutionalism’ – towards a different, more practically-oriented, approach to justice: 
‘realization-focused comparison’. Is Sen’s call for a paradigm shift in thinking about 
justice warranted? In this paper, I argue that it is not. Most of Sen’s criticisms are in 
fact either based on a misrepresentation of the Rawlsian approach, or correct but of 
little consequence. What political philosophy needs is not a paradigm shift, but a more 
nuanced understanding of the paradigm Sen and others criticize. 
                                                
∗ I wish to thank two anonymous reviewers and Economics & Philosophy co-editor Martin van 
Hees for their detailed and constructive written comments. I am also grateful to Geoff Brennan, Pablo 
Gilabert, Christian List, and Amartya Sen for helpful discussion.  
1 For a recent defence and interpretation of Rawlsian ideal theorizing see Simmons (2010). 
2 Sen (2009, Acknowledgements and ch. 2). 
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The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I offer a brief overview of 
Sen’s arguments against transcendental institutionalism, specifically focusing on three 
key complaints: (a) comparative judgments are what we want from a theory of justice, 
but transcendental institutionalism is neither necessary, nor sufficient for 
comparisons; (b) transcendental institutionalism is inherently parochial, and (c) 
transcendental institutionalism is inflexible. In section 3, I criticize Sen’s 
characterization of the Rawlsian paradigm as a form of transcendental 
institutionalism. With a clearer picture of the Rawlsian paradigm in mind, I respond, 
in sections 4-6, to Sen’s three criticisms, and show that they are either trivial or 
misguided.3 I conclude that Sen’s complaints are based on unfortunate 
mischaracterizations of Rawls’s method, which are pervasive in the existing literature. 
Sen’s arguments do not show that the Rawlsian paradigm is fundamentally defective, 
but rather, that it needs to be better understood and further developed.  
I should note that the argument I offer in this paper is negative. I do not 
discuss Sen’s own path-breaking contributions to political philosophy, whose value is 
not in dispute, but simply argue that his recent critique of Rawls’s approach to the 
subject misses its target. Although this article is mostly negative, by showing that 
Sen’s critique rests on a misdescription of the Rawlsian enterprise, my hope is to lay 
the foundations for a better-informed methodological debate in political philosophy. 
 
2. TRANSCENDENTAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS FLAWS 
Central to contemporary theorizing about justice, Sen observes, is the question ‘What 
is a just society?’. Those who, like Rawls, put this question at the heart of political 
philosophy subscribe to what Sen calls transcendental institutionalism. On the one 
hand, their approach is ‘transcendental’ because it aims to identify an ideal of a 
perfectly just society. On the other, it is ‘institutionalist’ because it attempts to 
establish what perfect institutional arrangements would be like, without paying much 
attention to the conduct of individuals. In short, transcendental institutionalists seek to 
identify a set of perfectly just social institutions. For them, societies in the real world 
                                                
3 For a recent and independently developed critique of Sen, which partly complements the present 
one, see Gilabert (forthcoming).  
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are unjust to the extent that they fail to exhibit such institutional perfection (Sen 2009: 
ch. 1).  
 Although this approach finds its origins in the works of Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau and Kant, Sen (2009: 7-8) sees Rawls’s theory of justice as ‘[t]he most 
powerful and momentous exposition’ of transcendental institutionalism. Recall that 
Rawls’s theory contains two key principles: 
 
1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the 
equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. 
 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached 
to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and 
second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. 
(Rawls 1993: 5-6).4  
 
In Sen’s view, this theory exhibits the following distinctive marks of transcendental 
institutionalism: (i) it delivers a unique and definitive set of principles, (ii) these 
principles select a particular set of institutions, and do not apply to individual 
behaviour, and (iii) a society whose institutions satisfy these principles is perfectly 
just. 
Despite its popularity, Sen (2006 and 2009) argues, the transcendental 
institutionalist paradigm fails to give us ‘what we want from a theory of justice’. That 
is, it fails to deliver theoretically sound conceptual tools that can help us advance 
justice in the real world.5 In particular, Sen puts forward three main complaints 
against transcendental institutionalism, which I outline below.6  
                                                
4 I am quoting from Political Liberalism because the formulation of the first principle has slightly 
changed since A Theory of Justice. Such a change (from reference to the maximal set of basic liberties 
to a fully adequate one) is of no consequence for the purposes of Sen’s argument. 
5 One way of putting Sen’s complaint is that a good theory of justice ought to be action-guiding. 
Action guidance may in turn be given either a strong or a weak reading. On the strong reading, a theory 
is suitably action-guiding if, and only if, it tells us how to make the world a better place here and now. 
This understanding of action-guidance strikes me as too strong to count as a plausible desideratum for a 
good theory of justice. Consider, for instance, the case of racial discrimination (clearly a social 
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2.1 Comparative Judgments of Justice Are What We Want, but Transcendental 
Institutionalism is neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Comparisons. 
Transcendental institutionalism, Sen argues, allows us to make judgments about what 
we might call ‘absolute’ justice. From a transcendental institutionalist perspective, a 
society is either perfectly just, or it is unjust. However, he continues, these are not the 
sorts of judgments we should be interested in, especially when it comes to the issue of 
advancing justice in the real world. Much more important are comparative judgments 
of justice and injustice, and for those, an answer to the question ‘what would a fully 
just society look like?’ is neither necessary, nor sufficient (Sen 2009: 98-106).7  
 Firstly, to know that the ‘iniquities of hunger, illiteracy, torture, arbitrary 
incarceration, or medical exclusion’ are sources of injustice, notes Sen, one need not 
have a detailed account of what qualifies as a perfectly just society (Sen 2006: 218 
and 2009: 96). We can establish whether a society is more or less just by reference to 
these criteria, without appealing to the higher-order ideal of a fully just social system. 
‘[T]he injustice of continuing famines in a world of prosperity, or of persistently 
grotesque subjugation of women’, can be easily detected without a complete and 
exhaustive picture of what full justice requires (Sen 2009: 103).  
 Secondly, knowing what a perfectly just society looks like does not 
automatically allow us to make comparative judgments of justice (Sen 2009: 98-101 
                                                
injustice). While a good theory of justice should identify racial discrimination as morally problematic 
(and tell us how problematic it is compared to other types of injustice), it would be unreasonable to 
expect such a theory to tell us how best to put an end to racial discrimination in the real world. To do 
so, one needs to be familiar with the specific context in which discrimination occurs, study the social 
relations existing in racist societies, get to know their political landscape, design specific policy 
proposals, and so forth. This type of work is very important, but I would not describe it in terms of 
designing a theory of justice. This does not seem to be the sense of action guidance Sen has in mind 
either. For Sen, a theory of justice is appropriately action-guiding or practical, if it provides a flexible 
framework for making comparative judgments of justice across different contexts. This weaker sense 
of guidance is the one I shall assume in the rest of the paper. 
6 Sen (2009: 90) lists 6 such complaints. In my discussion, some of the complaints are brought 
together under the same heading. 
7 Sen (2009: 15ff.) even describes the transcendental approach as ‘redundant’. 
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and 2006: 219-21). To make such judgments, we also need a metric to evaluate which 
social arrangements are furthest away from the ideal and what improvements would 
bring them closer to it. If we are interested in comparisons, theories like Rawls’s are 
thus radically incomplete. They offer us an ideal, but give us no tools to establish how 
far any specific social arrangement is form it.  
 In sum, since transcendental institutionalism is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for comparisons, its intellectual and practical contributions are unsatisfactory, and a 
different approach to theorizing about justice is needed.8  
 
2.2 Transcendental Institutionalism is Parochial and Status-quo-biased 
Sen (2009: 24-27, and ch. 6) complains that transcendental institutionalism unduly 
limits the scope of justice. This is because its demanding ideal of perfect justice can 
only be realized where state-like institutions exist. Only institutions such as those of 
the modern state can engage in the comprehensive redistributive policies advocated 
by most contemporary theories of justice. Since ought implies can, on this view, 
outside the state, principles of justice become irrelevant. This is why, Sen says, 
theorists such as Rawls (1999b) and Thomas Nagel (2005), to whom he ascribes this 
institutionalist paradigm, deny that principles of distributive justice apply to the 
global arena, and limit the scope of reasoning about justice to domestic political 
communities. In short, the search for perfect justice renders transcendental 
institutionalism oblivious to some of the gravest injustices plaguing our world: 
international ones. 
  
2.3 Transcendental Institutionalism is Inflexible  
Aiming at the identification of the perfectly just society, Sen (2009: 106-7) further 
argues, transcendental institutionalists tend to ignore the ‘inescapable plurality of 
                                                
8 Sen (2009: 105) is more explicit about the practical, rather than intellectual, deficiencies of the 
transcendental approach. For instance, he says: ‘Despite its own intellectual interest, the question “what 
is a just society” is not ... a good starting point for a useful theory of justice’. However, he also 
expresses theoretical dissatisfaction, suggesting that ‘[p]ractical concerns, no less than theoretical 
reasoning, seem to demand a fairly radical departure [from mainstream transcendental institutionalism] 
in the analysis of justice’ (Sen 2009: xii, emphasis added). 
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competing principles’ that any plausible approach to justice should acknowledge. 
Rawls’s original-position reasoning, for instance, is said to lead to the selection of a 
unique set of principles. It is unclear, however, whether all rational or reasonable 
persons would really assent to the theory of justice Rawls proposes. There may be a 
plurality of permissible principles, and the ambition to pick out one set, and one only, 
is misguided and counter-productive (Sen 2009: 46). 
 Moreover, subjecting principles of justice to ‘some radical surgery that 
reduces them all into one tidy box of complete and well-fitted demands’ can be 
hubristic and myopic (Sen 2009: 46). When designing a theory of justice, Sen (2009: 
107) suggests, we should always be open to revising our conclusions. For instance  
 
[w]e often think, if only implicitly, of the plausibility of principles in a number of specific 
cases .... But once the principles are formulated in unconstrained terms, covering inter alia a 
great many cases other than those that motivated our interest in those principles, we can run 
into difficulties that were not foreseen earlier, when we signed up, as it were, on a dotted line. 
We then have to decide what has to give and why.  
 
But, problematically, these trade-offs seem to be inadmissible within Rawls-inspired, 
transcendental theorizing, with its insistence on ‘exacting and highly demanding 
rules’ (Sen 2009: 107). Once we have identified what perfect justice requires, we can 
no longer revise that ideal. We remain trapped, so to speak, in the realm of perfection.  
 
In short, transcendental institutionalism seems ‘practically irrelevant’ on three key 
dimensions. First, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing what counts as 
more or less just in real-world circumstances. Second, it prevents us from applying 
principles of justice to many contexts, most importantly the global one, for which we 
feel such principles are most relevant. Third, it is inflexible and thus ill-suited to offer 
a framework for thinking about justice in a world where agents might not all agree on 
what justice requires. 
What could a Rawlsian respond to these charges? An easy response would be 
to point out that practical relevance is not what we want from a theory of justice. A 
theory of justice, on this view, is first and foremost a theoretical exercise, and its 
value is largely independent of its practical import. This response would be readily 
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available to philosophers like G.A. Cohen (2003: 243), who believe that justice is not 
primarily about what we ought to do, but about what we ought to think. However, this 
response is not available to the Rawlsian philosophers Sen is criticizing, since they 
believe that a sound theory of justice should be action-guiding.9 To defend 
themselves, Rawlsians cannot dismiss the accusations of lack of guidance capacity as 
irrelevant, but must show that they are ill-founded. This is my aim in the remainder of 
this paper. 
 
3. TRANSCENDENTAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RAWLSIAN PARADIGM 
Let me begin with a few clarifications regarding Sen’s description of the Rawlsian 
paradigm as a form of transcendental institutionalism. First, there is an apparent 
ambiguity in Sen’s use of the adjective ‘transcendental’. At first blush, by calling 
Rawls’s theory ‘transcendental’, Sen may be taken to suggest that the theory sets out 
principles for a perfectly just society, transcending the limits of human existence. 
This, of course, would make Rawls’s theory eminently non-practical.  
Although Rawls does indeed attempt to identify principles for a fully just 
society, those principles are far from being ‘transcendental’ in this sense. On the 
contrary, Rawls is keen to make sure that the principles he defends are consistent with 
Humean moderate scarcity and limited altruism, that the ‘ideal society’ he envisages 
is not beyond reach.10 Of course, one might argue that, substantively, Rawls has failed 
to accomplish this task, and that his favoured social arrangements are beyond the 
limits of human practical possibility. But this would not make Rawls’s approach in 
any way transcendental, it would only make his theory less plausible than it would 
otherwise be by Rawls’s own non-transcendental standards. In short, it is fair to say 
that Rawls’s theory is ‘ideal’, but inaccurate to say that it is transcendental in this 
sense. 
 As it turns out, on a charitable reading, this is not the sense of ‘transcendental’ 
Sen has in mind. For Sen (2009: 6), a theory is transcendental when it is ‘absolute’, 
namely non-comparative. While comparative principles of justice take roughly the 
                                                
9 For an analysis of this claim see Valentini (2009).  
10 See the discussion in Rawls (1999a: part III) and the remarks about realistic utopia in Rawls 
(1999b: 12 and 128). 
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form ‘Society X is more just than society Y if (or iff)…’, transcendental ones are 
formulated in the categorical form ‘Society X is perfectly just iff…’.  From this more 
formal perspective, Sen is correct in describing Rawls’s theory as transcendental 
(although he could have chosen a better label, such as ‘categorical’). Its two principles 
tell us what it takes for a society to be perfectly just, rather than for it to be more just 
than another. Whether this feature of Rawls’s theory is genuinely as problematic as 
Sen thinks is something I shall discuss later in the article. I now turn to the 
characterization of Rawls’s paradigm as institutionalist.  
Rawls, unlike Sen, is indeed an institutionalist, but not in the sense Sen seems 
to attribute to him.11 Sen complains that institutionalists are concerned with perfectly 
just institutions, but not with overall ‘social realizations’. In his words, 
‘transcendental institutionalism concentrates primarily on getting the institutions 
right, and it is not directly focused on the actual societies that would ultimately 
emerge’(Sen 2009: 6). This description of the Rawlsian paradigm is somewhat 
misleading. Rawls is an institutionalist insofar as his principles of justice are meant to 
apply to the basic structure of society (i.e., to its most important legal, political and 
economic institutions), rather than to individual behaviour. But Rawls’s principles do 
not single out one set of perfect institutions. Rather, on a Rawlsian view, the 
institutional arrangements which make a society just vary depending on the nature of 
the society in question, the character of its citizens and so forth.  
A society characterized by racial prejudices, for instance, may very well 
require affirmative action policies to realize Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity. 
                                                
11 Sen (2009: 7 and 78) briefly acknowledges that Rawls’s principles do not specify a set of perfect 
physical institutions, and that Rawls is not exclusively interested in institutional design but also in 
individual behaviour. He also insists, though, that Rawls’s theory is ‘[t]he most powerful and 
momentous exposition’ of transcendental institutionalism (8), and that ‘[i]n the Rawlsian system of 
justice as fairness direct attention is bestowed almost exclusively on just institutions’ (67, see also 46). 
For Sen, Rawls underappreciates the importance of actual human behaviour for the realization of 
justice because he assumes that, in ideal theory, citizens will do their part in supporting just 
institutions. Once just institutions have been selected, individuals will conform with their demands. 
Even though Sen is right to point out that this is the case in ideal theory, as I suggest in the main text, 
Rawls’s approach is still applicable to non-ideal circumstances in which citizens have not fully 
internalized the spirit of his principles of justice.  
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The very same policies, however, would violate fair equality of opportunity in a 
society in which no prejudices existed. In short, on a plausible Rawlsian approach, 
there is no such thing as an ‘ideal set of institutions’, but rather a set of lexically 
ordered principles (equal basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the 
difference principle) which can be realized by a number of different institutional 
arrangements. As Thomas Pogge (2000: 165 emphasis original and 2004) points out, 
‘Rawls’s criterion of justice assesses a basic structure by the distribution it would tend 
to produce in the actual social system it organizes.’ The institutional features of a just 
basic structure change depending on the particular social system they regulate 
precisely because what matters is ‘the actual society that would ultimately emerge’. 
With this clearer picture of the Rawlsian paradigm in mind, we can move on 
to assess Sen’s three challenges.  
 
4. RAWLS- STYLE  PRINCIPLES ARE NOT WHAT WE WANT FROM A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 
Sen’s first challenge is that, since an account of perfect justice is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for making comparative judgments of justice across different societies, the 
Rawlsian paradigm is seriously defective. Even though the paradigm allows us to 
make judgments about absolute justice – i.e., about whether a social system is 
perfectly just – the ability to make these judgments is not ‘what we want from a 
theory of justice’. Comparative judgments are of far greater importance, especially 
when it comes to advancing justice in the real world.  
 For this challenge to be successful, two claims have to be true: (i) there is little 
theoretical and (especially) practical value in knowing what perfect justice is, and (ii) 
the Rawlsian paradigm is neither necessary, nor sufficient for comparisons. In what 
follows, I take up and discuss each claim in turn.   
 
4.1 Rawlsian Perfect Justice Is of Little Relevance  
While I agree with Sen that an account of perfect justice is not all we want from a 
theory of justice, I also think it is part of what we want from any comprehensive such 
theory. In particular, an account of the principles which would govern a fully just 
society is necessary to establish when a society is ‘completely’ just. Sen significantly 
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downplays the importance of this particular aspect of Rawlsian theorizing. For 
instance, he suggests with some scepticism that  
 
it may well turn out that in a comparative perspective, the introduction of social policies that 
abolish slavery, or eliminate widespread hunger, or remove rampant illiteracy, can be shown to 
yield an advancement of justice. But the implementation of such policies could still leave the 
societies involved far away from the transcendental requirements of a fully just society (since 
transcendence would have other demands regarding equal liberties, distributional equity, and so 
on) (Sen 2006: 217).  
 
But why is it problematic that, from a Rawlsian perspective, a slavery-free society 
would still not qualify as fully just? Surely, Sen would agree with Rawls that justice 
requires a lot more than the abolition of slavery, and therefore that there can be 
societies that are significantly more just than the slavery-free ones mentioned in the 
present example.  
More generally, the claim that a society is (or can be) perfectly just says 
something important about both the nature of the value of justice, and how to orient 
our actions in the real world. With respect to the former, there is a crucial structural 
difference between a conception of justice, such as utilitarianism, in which justice can 
always be increased (in the form of greater sum-total utility), and one where justice 
cannot be increased indefinitely as a matter of principle.12 If part of the point of a 
theory of justice is (plausibly) to describe the nature of the value of justice, objecting 
to the theory that it is not ‘intrinsically’ comparative in the way utilitarianism, for 
instance, is, is somewhat beside the point. For it may be that the correct account of 
justice does have a cut-off point beyond which the idea of an increase in justice 
simply makes no sense. Unless Sen is prepared to deny this substantive claim, he 
cannot downplay the value of theorizing about perfect justice quite so easily. 
Moreover, from a practical perspective, if it is true that justice has a cut-off 
point, then we have an interest in knowing what that point is. This will enable us to 
decide whether we should strive to change existing circumstances – insofar as they 
                                                
12 Cf. Pogge’s (1989: 41) discussion of the difference between Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ and 
utilitarianism. As I shall note later in the paper, though, Rawls’s theory does contain important 
comparative elements. 
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depart from the ideal – or preserve the status quo. We should better know if our 
society is just, and no more justice-improvements are necessary or possible.13 
 So far, I have defended the theoretical as well as practical significance of 
perfect justice. This already diminishes the import of Sen’s accusation that Rawls-
style principles are neither necessary nor sufficient for comparative judgments of 
justice. If what Rawls does is necessary for something else, and this is also of some 
importance, the call for a paradigm shift in justice theory appears overstated.  
 
4.2 Rawlsian Justice is both Unnecessary and Insufficient for Comparisons 
Let me begin with the claim that Rawlsian ‘perfect’ justice is unnecessary for justice-
comparisons. In one respect, this claim is correct. For instance, a society in which 
people are arbitrarily arrested is obviously more unjust than one in which, all other 
things equal, they are not. Similarly, a society in which women are subjugated is 
clearly more unjust than one in which, all other things equal, they are not. No account 
of perfect justice is needed to make these kinds of judgments. 
 Despite being correct, this observation is also inconsequential. There are many 
judgments of justice – both absolute and comparative – we make confidently and 
intuitively. These include the judgments about arbitrary arrest, destitution, illiteracy 
and severe human suffering Sen invokes in support of his claim that transcendental 
principles are not what we want from a theory of justice. Problematically, however, 
Sen seems to ignore that no theory is needed to formulate such judgments in the first 
place. If anything, those judgments constrain any plausible normative theory: a theory 
of justice that permits child torture, women abuse, and arbitrary arrest is obviously 
absurd. By arguing that, to make straightforward comparative judgments, we do not 
                                                
13 Of course, non-comparative theories of justice can still allow us to make a few trivial 
comparisons. For example, if three societies all embody the ideal of perfect justice, we can say that 
they are all equally just (which is to say, they are all just). Similarly, if of two societies, one realizes 
perfect justice and the other does not, we can say that the latter is (obviously) more unjust than the 
former. This, however, does not cancel the difference between comparative and non-comparative 
theories. While the principles constituting comparative theories of justice take the form “Society X is 
more just than society Y iff”, those constituting non-comparative ones take the form “Society X is fully 
just iff”. 
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need a theory of perfect justice, Sen proves too much. As it turns out, to make those 
judgments, we need no theory. 
 What, then, is a theory of justice supposed to do? Why do we need a theory of 
justice to begin with? Rawls’s practically-oriented answer is that a theory of justice is 
necessary to establish how to distribute scarce goods (including liberties, 
opportunities, wealth, and the social bases of self-respect) we all need to lead lives 
worth living. If there were no conflicts over goods, there would be no need for a 
theory of justice in the first place.14 Similarly, there would be little point in theorizing 
about justice if we were already certain about how goods ought to be distributed and 
we all agreed on the relevant distributive criterion, and the reasons in support of it. 
But this is not the situation in which we find ourselves, both individually and 
collectively.  
Individually, we often have strongly held convictions about what counts as 
just and unjust, but no overarching criterion helping us to check their mutual 
consistency and to understand their relations to one another. Collectively, we often 
disagree about what counts as just or unjust, and when we agree in judging some 
actions or states of affairs as just or unjust, we typically rank them differently. Is a 
society that arbitrarily arrests some of its citizens more or less unjust than one in 
which part of the citizenry lives in conditions of poverty and destitution? Is a society 
with the death penalty more or less just than one in which the death penalty has been 
abolished but where serious crimes are committed much more frequently?  
These are the sorts of questions on which people’s intuitions are either shaky 
or divergent (or both). It is because we find ourselves in situations of uncertainty, 
disagreement, and confusion that we engage in abstract theorizing about justice along 
the lines suggested by Rawls. In Rawls’s (1999a: 508) own words, when we theorize 
about justice we produce ‘argument addressed to those who disagree with us, or to 
ourselves when we are of two minds.’ Normative justification ‘presumes a clash of 
views between persons or within one person’. Unless we want to content ourselves 
                                                
14 This is why Rawls (1999a: 126-30) himself appeals to the Humean circumstances of justice: 
moderate scarcity and limited altruism. 
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with our unsystematic and diverging intuitive judgments, Rawlsian-style higher-order 
moral reasoning becomes unavoidable (Rawls 1999a: 42ff.).15 
From this perspective, designing an overall conception of what justice requires 
is necessary for practical purposes – a view Sen also endorses. We need to develop a 
general account of justice to become clear about our priorities, about what is more or 
less important as a matter of justice, and about how our seemingly conflicting 
intuitions fit together.16 The process of achieving greater clarity and coherence in our 
judgments of justice gradually delivers a picture of what justice requires. Without 
such a picture, coherent guidance in matters of justice would seem to be impossible. 
At this point, Sen may agree that general principles of justice, worked out in 
abstraction from many contingent aspects of human existence, are necessary to make 
systematic and action-guiding judgments of justice and injustice. However, he might 
further argue, the real problem with Rawls’s theory is that its abstract principles are 
formulated in absolute, rather than comparative, terms. Instead of claiming that 
‘Society X is more just than society Y if (or iff)…’, Rawls’s principles state ‘Society 
X is perfectly just iff…’ and this renders the principles unsuitable for making 
comparative judgments of justice.  
There are two things Rawlsians can respond to Sen’s charge. First, as I have 
already noted, it is by no means obvious or evident that the value of a theory of justice 
lies entirely in its conduciveness to comparative judgments. If there is such a thing as 
absolute justice, then a good theory of justice should, among other things, tell us what 
this is. That said, a good theory of justice should also enable us to compare different 
social systems from the viewpoint of justice. Is Rawls’s theory so useless in this 
respect? I believe not, and this leads me to the second response.  
Although Rawls’s theory is formulated in absolute terms, important tools for 
comparison can be extrapolated from it. For example, its appeal to the lexicographic 
priority of the basic liberties vis-à-vis fair equality of opportunity and the difference 
principle already enables us to establish that a society in which citizens’ fundamental 
liberties are violated is more unjust than one in which such liberties are respected, no 
                                                
15 See also Rawls’s his remarks about reflective equilibrium. 
16 Cf. some of the remarks in Swift (2008: 372-5). 
 13 
matter how unequal its distribution of income and wealth is. Moreover, Rawls’s 
difference principle is comparative in nature: it allows us to assess alternative basic 
structures by reference to their impact on the position of the worst off.17 Indeed, Sen 
(2009: 97) is aware that ‘Rawls’s formulation of the difference principle … gives us 
ground enough to rank other alternatives in terms of the respective advantages of the 
worst-off’. To that extent, Rawls’s ‘absolute’ theory of justice is in no way inimical to 
comparisons, or unable to deliver any. 
Of course, this does not mean that a Rawls-style theory can give us all answers 
to comparative questions of justice. This leads us to Sen’s claim that the 
‘transcendental’ theorizing Rawls and the Rawlsians engage in is insufficient for 
making comparative judgments of justice and injustice. Taken literally, this claim is 
false. As I have already suggested, it seems undeniable that principles like the ones 
Rawls proposes do take us a fairly long way towards the possibility of making some 
comparative judgments of justice and injustice. For instance, the principles clearly 
establish (if one accepts them) that violations of basic liberties are more serious than 
violations of fair equality of opportunity which, in turn, are more serious than 
violations of the difference principle.  
A correct claim, in the vicinity of Sen’s, is instead that Rawls’s theory only 
allows us to make some comparative judgments of justice. For instance, the theory 
does not tell us how violations of different basic liberties are to be traded-off against 
one another (Sen 2009: 99 and 2006: 220). And while there may be clear-cut cases 
(e.g., a small restriction in freedom of movement is less unjust than torture), there are 
also bound to be controversial ones, in which ranking different societies from the 
viewpoint of justice proves extremely difficult. However, this merely amounts to 
acknowledging that a Rawlsian-style theory is incomplete, and thus does not 
automatically deliver all solutions to all problems of justice. More work needs to be 
done — this is for sure — but, once again, no paradigm shift is called for. 
To conclude, the complaint that Rawls-style ‘transcendental’ principles of 
justice are neither necessary nor sufficient for comparative judgments of justice is far 
from revealing the need for a paradigm shift in theorizing about justice. First, since 
                                                
17 See the discussion in Sen (1970), and Pogge (1989: 43). 
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the comparative is only part of what we want from a theory of justice, even if a 
particular account of justice is unnecessary for purposes of comparison, it can still be 
of theoretical and practical value. Second, as it turns out, Rawls’s ‘absolute’ 
principles of justice do give us some important materials to compare alternative social 
arrangements. This suggests that Rawls’s theory – which Sen considers to be the most 
important example of transcendental institutionalism – delivers much, although not 
all, of what Sen himself wants from a theory of justice.  
 
5. AN ARBITRARY RESTRICTION OF THE SCOPE OF JUSTICE? 
The second critique Sen mounts against the Rawlsian approach to justice concerns its 
restricted scope. By arguing for such demanding principles, Sen (2006: 226-8 and 
2009: 24-7) claims, Rawls and other philosophers who follow his paradigm (for 
instance Thomas Nagel) inevitably limit the scope of justice to those contexts in 
which there already exist institutions capable of realizing it: bounded societies. This 
has two unpalatable implications. First, it makes talk of justice inapplicable to the 
global arena, where in fact most of us feel that appeals to justice are urgent and 
appropriate. Second, it unduly restricts the scope of the reasoning by which principles 
of justice are arrived at. Recall that Rawls’s thought experiment, the original position, 
only contains the representatives of cooperating members of a particular society. But 
why should our reasoning about justice (even if justice is thought to be confined to the 
domestic arena) be limited in this way? Wouldn’t foreign perspectives enrich our 
deliberations? Let me consider both aspects of the scope restriction in turn. 
Sen is right that the fact that currently there exist no institutions capable of 
realizing Rawls’s egalitarian distributive principles on a global scale does not suffice 
as a reason for denying their global moral validity. If it were possible to construct the 
institutions needed to realize them at reasonable costs to those involved, then such 
institutions ought to be constructed. What Sen seems to miss in his account of why 
Rawls and Nagel deny the applicability of (egalitarian) justice globally is that they are 
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not primarily concerned with issues of feasibility, but rather, with issues of moral 
appropriateness.18  
On what strikes me as the most plausible interpretation of their views, 
stringent principles of (egalitarian) justice are morally appropriate only when certain 
kinds of social relations are in place. Rawlsians disagree about what the relevant 
relations are: some believe they are coercive relations, others think they concern 
reciprocity in the production and distribution of certain social goods and so forth.19 
Settling these disagreements is not necessary for present purposes. The important 
point is that, on a plausible reading of Rawls and Nagel, what justifies their domain-
restriction for principles of (egalitarian) justice is not a commitment to transcendental 
institutionalism. Central to their views is instead the normative claim that (egalitarian) 
justice only applies in the presence of certain types of social relations, coupled with 
the empirical claim that such relations do not exist at the global level. In sum, to 
criticize Rawls’s and Nagel’s stances on global political morality, Sen needs to 
engage with their normative and empirical underpinnings, but these underpinnings 
have very little to do with transcendental institutionalism. 
Let me now turn to the second aspect of Sen’s ‘scope’ critique. This concerns 
the variety of perspectives that can contribute to our reasoning about justice (Sen 
2009: 138-45). Of course, if the scope of principles of justice were indeed global — 
                                                
18 Nagel (2005: 115-16) does make some points concerning feasibility (see esp. his remarks on 
Hobbes and sovereignty), but his core argument, about the justificatory demands triggered by the 
special involvement of citizens’ will in coercive law-making, concerns moral appropriateness. 
Similarly, while like Kant in Perpetual Peace, Rawls (2009b: 36) is sceptical about the possibility of 
bringing about a just global state capable of realizing egalitarian justice worldwide, this does not seem 
to be the main reason for his rejection of global egalitarianism. Many commentators now agree that 
Rawls’s stance of global justice rests on the more general conviction that different normative principles 
apply to different types of social relations (see, e.g., James 2005, and Meckled-Garcia 2008). Another 
possibility – which, unlike the former, I do not consider in the main text – is that Rawls’s denial of the 
applicability of egalitarian justice to the global arena rests on his commitment to the value of toleration 
of non-liberal, yet decent, societies. Applying liberal principles of justice to the world at large, Rawls 
suggests, would be too narrow-minded and parochial. For a statement and critique of this view, see Tan 
(1998). Note though that this interpretation would weaken Sen’s second complaint against Rawls’s 
theory – to be discussed shortly in the main text – which points to its alleged parochialism.  
19 For an overview see Abizadeh (2007). See also Sangiovanni (2007).  
 16 
say because the relevant relations existed globally — then it would seem entirely 
arbitrary to restrict the scope of reasoning about justice to a particular society. The 
design of principles of justice should take into consideration the voice of everyone to 
whom they apply. This is precisely the rationale behind Rawls’s domestic original-
position thought experiment: assuming a closed society, principles of justice should 
be unanimously accepted by citizen representatives behind a veil of ignorance.20 But 
can the scope of reasoning about justice be detached from the scope of application of 
principles of justice, as Sen suggests? In other words, if we are designing principles of 
justice for society X, should we also take into account what members of societies A, 
B, C think about them? 
This is an interesting suggestion. In a Millian spirit, theorists of justice should 
be willing to test their views against as many opponents (or as many other people) as 
possible (Mill 1985 [1859]: ch. 2). Only this can guarantee the type of impartiality 
Rawls (and Sen) are looking for. Sen (2006: 235 and 2009: 149-52) is therefore right 
when he says that ‘the demands of objectivity not only require avoiding a “personal 
slant” (as Rawls noted), but also national parochialism….’. However, there seems to 
be a fundamental problem with the open public reasoning approach Sen favours, and 
this has to do with setting the boundaries of reasoning about justice. 
In the Rawlsian (1993: 26) architecture, these boundaries are set by the 
constraints built into the original position thought experiment, which is meant to 
articulate the ideals of citizens as free and equal and of society as a fair system of 
cooperation. For instance, the reasons and perspectives of those who believe that 
different human beings have different moral worth and that some are intrinsically 
superior to others, are barred from entering the deliberative process via which 
principles of justice are selected. For Rawls, a commitment to the fundamental moral 
equality of persons is a necessary prerequisite for participating in that process. Sen, on 
the other hand, seems to reject this idea – given that many of those whom he would 
want to include in the deliberation process might disagree with it. There are many 
societies in which, for instance, women are considered inferior to men. How should 
                                                
20 Rawls restricts his reasoning to ‘normal’ cases, assuming representatives of capable citizens 
(which excludes, for e.g., the severely disabled). 
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the views of those who hold this conviction be factored into the process of reasoning 
about justice? How are they to be dealt with? 
These questions raise an important challenge for Sen’s view. His ideal of 
public and open reasoning about justice either is so inclusive as to become almost 
empty (given that public reasoning will contain completely irreconcilable views) or it 
surreptitiously implies certain substantive moral commitments which automatically 
exclude perspectives that are distant enough from the liberal one.  
The latter alternative is probably most likely to be correct. After all, there 
would be an obvious clash with Sen’s procedurally inclusive approach if he were not 
also committed to the moral equality of persons. Why should we want to extend the 
principle ‘audi alteram partem’ globally, if not because of a belief in the moral 
equality of persons? However, once we concede a belief in the moral equality of 
persons, we have already substantially restricted the scope of (public) reasoning about 
justice to those views which are consistent with that belief, in which case Sen’s 
position is not that far from Rawls’s after all. In short, anti-parochialism is laudable 
and important, but no coherent theory of justice can be anti-parochial all the way 
down. Certain fundamental commitments – such as commitments to liberty and 
equality – must be non-negotiable. To the extent that Sen does not wish to abandon 
those commitments, his view cannot boast much greater inclusiveness than Rawls’s. 
 
6. IS RAWLSIAN JUSTICE INFLEXIBLE? 
It remains to analyze the last of Sen’s three complaints against Rawlsian theorizing. 
This points to its alleged lack of flexibility and open-endedness. First, Rawls defends 
one set of principles as the output of the original position thought-experiment but, as 
it turns out, there may be a plurality of admissible principles which might be chosen 
in the original position. Rawls’s theory, then, is too ambitious. It aims to be complete, 
to establish what perfect justice requires, while in fact a ‘partial’ – albeit abstract and 
general – ideal of justice is all we need and can plausibly reach. Second, the principles 
Rawls defends do not seem to be open to revision. They indicate what perfect justice 
requires, and are thus as demanding as they are inflexible. This makes Rawls’s theory 
of justice unable to offer a basis for a fruitful public discussion, and reduces both its 
theoretical and practical appeal. 
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Are these complaints well-founded? They are not.21 First, in his later work, 
Rawls himself acknowledged that there is a plurality of reasonable liberal conceptions 
of justice, which may be less distributively egalitarian than his own ‘justice as 
fairness’.22 More generally, it is true that Rawls might have been too optimistic about 
the possibility of conclusively justifying a theory of justice as rich and demanding as 
the one he proposed in his early work. But it seems odd to criticize his 
methodological paradigm on these grounds, when he himself has explicitly 
acknowledged this shortcoming. Moreover, it is also hard to see the excessive 
ambition of the early Rawls as calling for a paradigm shift in theorizing about justice. 
Sen’s argument, as I see it, does not show that we need not think about what a fully 
just (or reasonably just) society is. Rather, it points to the fact that our prospects of 
offering a plausible and robust justification for a highly specific account of justice are 
not as good as many theorists, including the early (but not the later) Rawls, think they 
are.  
That said, Rawls has always remained firm on the possibility of identifying 
constitutional essentials and fundamental principles of justice that any reasonably just 
society should satisfy. I assume that Sen would not want to disagree with this weaker 
claim. Indeed, while it may be sensible to reduce the ambitions of our theorizing 
about justice, as we have already noted, taking this modesty to the extreme would 
make theories of justice entirely useless. A theory of justice has to say something 
substantive about what justice requires in order to be of interest in the first place.  
 Let me thus turn to the second complaint advanced by Sen. In Sen’s view, the 
dominant, Rawls-inspired paradigm delivers principles of justice which are, in some 
sense, unrevisable. Although this is a charge that can perhaps be plausibly made 
                                                
21 Pablo Gilabert (forthcoming) has independently developed an argument against Sen, partly 
similar to the one I offer here.  
22 This is already the case in Rawls (1993: 223 and 227), where Rawls says that the elements 
characterizing the public culture of liberal societies ‘can be seen in different ways, so there are many 
liberalisms’ beyond his own. And ‘It is inevitable and often desirable that citizens have different views 
as to the most appropriate political conception; for the public political culture is bound to contain 
different fundamental ideas that can be developed in different ways’. This becomes even more explicit 
in Rawls (1999b). Interestingly, Sen (2009: 11-12 and 58) is not unaware of this.  
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against some contemporary political philosophers, I do not think it can plausibly be 
directed to those who take Rawls’s methodology seriously. 
 Rawls’s entire architectonic of justice, including the original position thought-
experiment, is embedded in the holistic method of reflective equilibrium. Within such 
a method, no assumptions, principles or claims are taken for granted or 
unproblematically assumed. Everything is open to revision, and ‘fixed points’ are 
only provisionally fixed.23 When trying to reach reflective equilibrium, we have to go 
back-and-forth between general principles and considered judgments in search for 
overall balance. Within this process, we are constantly faced precisely with those 
decisions about what to revise, and why, which Sen sees as never arising within a 
‘transcendental’ approach to justice. Recall his quote from a previous section:  
 
[w]e often think, if only implicitly, of the plausibility of principles in a number of specific 
cases .... But once the principles are formulated in unconstrained terms, covering inter alia a 
great many cases other than those that motivated our interest in those principles, we can run 
into difficulties that were not foreseen earlier, when we signed up, as it were, on a dotted line. 
We then have to decide what has to give and why. Some may find social choice theory to be 
too permissive and indecisive … but the alternative, well illustrated by mainstream theories of 
justice, like Rawls’s or Nozick’s, does not give the idea of justice its due (Sen 2009: 107). 
 
The particular reasoning process Sen associates with his preferred approach to justice, 
and sees as alien to mainstream Rawlsian theorizing, in fact turns out to be nothing 
other than reflective equilibrium.24  
What is more, Rawls is quite explicit in his openness to revising not only his 
principles of justice in light of opposing intuitive judgments, but also the very 
conditions built into the original position. In his words:  
                                                
23 Rawls (1999a: 17-8, 42-3, and 506-9). See also the argument in Richardson (2006), which shows 
how, if Rawls’s theory is seen primarily as offering a flexible methodology based on the general idea 
of an initial choice situation (of which the original position is only one possible interpretation), it can 
serve as a useful analytical tool for thinking about justice in the case of the severely disabled. 
24 Sen’s critique may be more plausible in the case of Nozick. Note that Sen (2009: 126) also briefly 
acknowledges the role of reflective equilibrium in Rawls’s theory, but does not seem fully to appreciate 
the extent to which reflective equilibrium exhibits many aspects of his own favoured methodology. 
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[i]n searching for the most favoured description of this situation [i.e., the original position] we 
work from both ends. … By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the 
contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to 
principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both 
expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered 
judgments… (Rawls 1999a: 18). 
 
Once this is appreciated, Sen’s complaint that Rawls’s methodology is aimed at 
delivering only one set of principles appears all the more bizarre. Even if the early 
Rawls thought that only one such set of principles could be compatible with the 
original position thought-experiment, that very thought-experiment was itself always 
open to revision in light of new intuitive judgments and considerations. For Rawls 
and the Rawlsians, the process of theorizing about justice is inherently dynamic and 
open-ended. Sen’s charge of inflexibility is therefore also misguided.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this article I have raised some doubts about Amartya Sen’s recent critique of the 
Rawlsian paradigm in theorizing about justice. Taken together, my arguments suggest 
that, at most, this paradigm needs to be better understood, and further developed, but 
is far from being fundamentally flawed in the ways Sen describes. On closer scrutiny, 
the Rawlsian paradigm delivers much of what Sen himself wants from a theory of 
justice. Sen has simply chosen the wrong target. The paradigm he criticizes is not the 
one pioneered by Rawls. If there are transcendental institutionalists, Rawls is not one 
of them.  
That said, nothing of what I have argued should be read as an endorsement of 
Rawls’s substantive, as opposed to methodological, views or as suggesting that these 
views cannot be further improved. Moreover, Sen’s emphasis on the importance of 
advancing justice in the real world, and his focus on comparative judgments of justice 
are laudable. My aim has been to show that his critique of Rawls’s method is, for the 
most part, misdirected and, in so doing, to provide the background for a more fruitful 
methodological debate within political philosophy.   
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